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Abstract  
This paper grapples with the question of whether the law of psychiatric injury remains fit for 
purpose in the twenty-first century. Through analysing the historical development of this area 
of law an attempt is made to understand how it has come to be degradingly described as a 
patchwork quilt of distinctions. Once the history has been set out an attempt is made to learn 
from whatever historical mistakes there may have been and devise a way forward whereby 
the mistakes of the past can be avoided and a return to clarity can be achieved. 
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Introduction 
Despite being suggested by Brett MR in Heaven v Pender,2 in 1883 it was not until Donoghue 
v Stevenson3 in 1932 that the principle of a general duty of care began to gain weight in the 
United Kingdom. The much-quoted passage by Lord Atkin from Donoghue laid the first stone 
for the foundation of the common law of negligence.4 Colloquially termed ‘the neighbour 
principle’ Lord Atkin stated:  
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not 
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, who is my neighbour? 
…The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as 
being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions 
which are called in question.5 
                                                          
1 Jordan is currently studying a LLM in Human Rights Law at the University of Bristol and next year 
plans to volunteer in The Gambia teaching and providing aid to the local communities. He graduated 
from Plymouth Univeristy with a first class degree and was awarded the Plymouth Law School Prize 
for the Best Student on the Dispute Resolution Skills Module.  
2 Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 para.509. 
3Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
4 Thornton, L., ‘TORT – ‘Caparo’: duty and negligence’, (1990) Law Society Guardian Gazette at p.1. 
5 Donoghue, at p.580 
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Even after this landmark case the courts were not prepared to fully recognise the existence of 
a general duty of care. As such, it was not until Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co6 that a pre-
existing general duty of care became enshrined in law owing to the judgement of Lord Reid 
where he stated that the neighbour principle should apply unless there was a justification or 
valid explanation for its exclusion.7 The effect of this decision was that a duty of care was now 
automatically assumed between the parties and the claimant need only show that it should 
not be excluded, as opposed to the previous position where the claimant faced the challenge 
of proving that a duty existed in the first place. This was confirmed by Anns v Merton London 
Borough Council8 in which a straightforward two-part test was devised. In applying this test, 
the court would first ask whether the two parties had a sufficient relationship of proximity so 
that the damage caused could be deemed reasonably foreseeable. Then it would be asked 
whether there was any specific reason which should defeat a duty of care between the two 
parties. If the first was answered affirmatively and the second negatively then a duty of care 
would exist. This test, and the simple approach to imposing liability which it advocated, led to 
Anns being regarded as the ‘apotheosis of the expansionist era’.9 However, the judiciary 
quickly moved away from this requirement with the implementation of the Caparo test and the 
requirement to ask whether the imposition of the duty would be fair, just and reasonable. The 
Caparo test was the end of the wide-ranging imposition of liability which was categorised by 
Anns and the beginning of the incremental development for categories of liability in the tort of 
negligence.10  
 
1 Unintentionally Caused Psychiatric Injury within the Tort of Negligence 
In the context of this article psychiatric injury refers to the infliction upon the claimant of a 
recognised psychiatric illness. The question of whether the symptoms experienced by the 
claimant constitute a recognised psychiatric illness is answered by seeking professional 
psychological advice and referring to either the DSM-V or the ICD-10.11 Historically, trying to 
establish that a duty of care was owed not to unintentionally cause psychiatric harm has, over 
the course of its development, given rise to a plethora of difficulties. This is partly due to the 
fact that liability in this area of law has been plagued by a raft of policy considerations since 
                                                          
6 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970] 2 WLR 1140. 
7 Ibid. at p.1027. 
8 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728.  
9 Patten, K., ‘Personal injury: Snail trail’ (2012) 162 New Law Journal 643.  
10 Stychin, C., ‘The vulnerable subject of negligence law’, (2012) 8 International Journal of Law in 
Context 337 at p.338. 
11 The DSM-V is an abbreviation for the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders which is published by the American Psychological Association. The ICD-10 is an 
abbreviation for the 10th edition of the International Classification of Diseases and although published 
in North America the ICD-10 is most commonly used throughout the European continent. 
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its early conception. The first was the belief that psychiatric injury, or nervous shock as it was 
originally called, was an injury reserved for frail Victorian heroines.12 This is perhaps due to 
the fact those who claimed a duty of care was owed to them were traditionally women who, 
as a result of fright, suffered either a miscarriage or some form of psychiatric harm.13 It has 
been commented that due to the first major cases all being concerned with females psychiatric 
injury was subconsciously confirmed as a phenomenon reserved for women which 
subsequently introduced gender into the law in ‘a very subtle way’.14 Also, the courts have 
been concerned with the ‘floodgates’ of liability being opened along with the relative ease with 
which they seem to believe symptoms in this field of injury can be feigned. It has been stated 
that it may be difficult to guard against ‘imaginary’ claims15 and as recently as 1991 the fear of 
the floodgates opening played a central consideration in the reasoning of the House of Lords 
in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire16 and was again one of the reasons for which 
compensation was not awarded in the 1999 case of White v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire.17 
 
Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas was the first case to create a set method of 
imposing liability for psychiatric injury, namely the ‘impact rule’. This case concerned the 
negligent act of a gatekeeper which caused a crash in Australia in 1866. The result of this 
crash was that Mrs Coultas suffered a miscarriage. Sir Richard Couch who gave the leading 
judgement spoke of an express judicial distrust towards the claimant who sought damages 
and his own personal concern that allowing damages in this scenario could open up a wide 
field for imaginary claims.18 At this point, it is important to note the social pressures of the time. 
The industrial revolution was in its infancy and in 1867 and 1873 there were two large-scale 
reports commissioned to examine the extent to which accidents of the kind in Coultas could 
be prevented.19 Of interest are the passages within the 1873 report at pages 12-13 where The 
Duke of Somerset, Lord Seymour, persistently expresses concern over the amount of 
accidents that are occurring on the railways and becomes particularly concerned with the 
amount of damages that arise from these accidents. Against this backdrop, it is no surprise 
                                                          
12 Mullany, N., and Handford, P., ‘Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage’ (1993), p.vii. 
13 Chamallas, M., and Kerber, L., ‘Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History’, (1989-1999) 88 
Michigan Law Review 814. 
14 Ibid at p.827. 
15 Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 AC 222. 
16Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310. 
17White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 at p.492. 
18 Coultas, at p.227. 
19 Royal Commission on Railways 1867 and Select Committee of the House of Lords on the 
Regulation of Railways (Prevention of Accidents) Bill 1873.  
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that it has been suggested that the decision in Coultas was influenced by these external 
pressures.20 
 
The impact rule remained the leading principle surrounding imposition for liability with regards 
to psychiatric injury until the case of Dulieu v White & Sons21 undermined the impact rule and 
found that to bring a successful claim of psychiatric injury the claimant need only fear 
immediate personal injury.22 This principle became known as the ‘fear of harm’ or ‘zone of 
danger’ approach. The zone of danger approach was heavily critiqued as although it removed 
much of the unfairness surrounding the impact rule it continued to draw arbitrary lines when 
imposing liability such as the example given by Bankes LJ in Hambrook v Stokes.23 Bankes 
LJ hypothesised a scenario where two mothers crossed the street both holding their child by 
the hand during a fictional accident. One mother fears only for her child whilst the other fears 
only for herself. Bankes LJ argued that it could not be right that the mother who cared only for 
herself, whom he regarded as ‘less deserving’, would be able to claim but the mother who 
feared only for her child could not.24 Accordingly, the case of Hambrook, decided by the Court 
of Appeal, was the first in which a successful claim was allowed where the claimant feared 
only for the safety of another person, her daughter, as opposed to fearing for their own safety. 
 
Though the case of Hambrook had settled who could claim for psychiatric injury a question 
remained as to what conditions were needed for liability to arise. In 1943, the case of Bourhill 
v Young25 reached the House of Lords, and as a result, psychiatric injury was considered by 
the highest appellate court of the land for the first time. The case concerned a pregnant fishwife 
who witnessed the aftermath of a motor accident which subsequently caused her to suffer a 
miscarriage. The House of Lords decided that to bring a successful claim the type of injury 
caused must be a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions and the defendant 
must reasonably appreciate this.26 As such the claimant was unable to bring a successful 
claim as a reasonable person would not have foreseen that the claimant would have suffered 
in the way that she did.  
Finally, the case of King v Phillips27 sees yet another doctrinal restriction begin to take hold 
with regards to liability in this area. The requirement that the claimant must suffer from shock 
                                                          
20 Diaz, R., Non-Physical Damage, A Comparative Analysis (2010) Thesis (PhD) The University of 
Canterbury at pp.7-8. 
21Dulieu v White and Sons [1901] 2 KB 669. 
22 Ibid. at p.682. 
23 Hambrook v Stokes [1925] 1 KB 141.  
24 Ibid at p.151. 
25Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92. 
26 Ibid at p.105. 
27King v Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429 (CA). 
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as a result of hearing or seeing something with their own unaided senses to be able to bring 
a successful claim.28 In this case, a taxi driver slowly and inadvertently backed over a child on 
his tricycle while his mother watched from a window some 70 yards away. Lord Denning, in 
denying the claimant compensation, stated that the harm must be caused by a sudden shock 
not a slow and gradual realisation.29 By looking back over the piecemeal development of this 
area of law it is possible to see the beginnings of the substantive rules that would be laid down 
by Lord Wilberforce in Mc Loughlin v O’Brian and subsequently affirmed as the method for 
imposing liability in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire. 
 
2 Primary Victims 
With each new change in the law or change to the definition of a primary victim the courts 
have struggled to strike the balance between affording protection to claimants, keeping up 
with medical advances and not overburdening defendants. Perhaps it is the case of Dulieu v 
White and Sons which can be described as the first step on the slow road to gaining a deeper 
understanding of the medical knowledge concerning psychiatric injury. In this case, a pregnant 
barmaid suffered a miscarriage because a stage coach careered through the window of a pub 
where she was working. The claimant was not impacted upon in any physical sense bit her 
claim was still successful. Through reading the judgement and the judgements of other 
jurisdictions which Kennedy J had relied upon, it is possible to see a shift in judicial thinking 
and a deeper understanding of the medical profession. One judgement relied upon by 
Kennedy J was the Irish case Bell v The Great Northern and Western Railway Company.30 In 
that case Palles CB begins the idea that as the question of what caused the injury is to be 
decided entirely by the medical profession it is not for the courts to intervene and dictate it 
must be a physical act to bring about liability and that psychiatric harm would suffice. Yet 
although the court in Dulieu, agreed with the sentiment, they still imposed the requirement, 
that the harm must be caused by fear to oneself. Yet, the ‘real confusion’31 with regards to 
primary victims began when the definition was again considered in Alcock v Chief Constable 
of South Yorkshire. In this case, Lord Oliver drew a distinction by saying that those claimants 
who are a ‘participant’ can bring a claim as a primary victim whereas those claimants which 
are classed as ‘unwilling witness[es]’ of the event must bring a claim as secondary victims.32 
Since then the House of Lords have struggled to maintain a clear definition of what they 
                                                          
28 Ibid at p.441. 
29 Ibid at p.442. 
30Bell v The Great Northern and Western Railway Company (1890) 26 LR Ir. 
31 Handford, P., ‘When the Telephone Rings’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 597 at p. 602. 
32 Alcock at p.407. 
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consider to be a primary victim, yet the one constant appears to be that, since Alcock, each 
offered definition is narrower than the last.33 
 
This is first noticeable in Page v Smith34 where Lord Lloyd classifies a primary victim as a 
‘participant’ but also provides that they must be ‘within the range of foreseeable physical 
injury.’ By construing a primary victim in such a way Lord Lloyd excluded those claimants who 
would have routinely been classified as a primary victim under the Alcock definition, such as 
the defendant police officers in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, owing purely to 
the fact that they were not within the zone of foreseeable physical injury. The facts of Page 
involved a minor road accident in which neither driver was physically injured. A few hours after 
the accident Mr Page began to suffer from myalgic encephalomyelitis35 which diagnosed some 
20 years ago had been lying dormant. As a result of this condition returning he claimed 
damages as he was unable to return to work. The defendants argued that the claimant should 
not be awarded damages because although physical injury was reasonably foreseeable, 
psychiatric injury was too remote a consequence. The House of Lords by a bare majority of 
3:2 opined that in circumstances where the claimant did not actually experience physical harm, 
but it was reasonably foreseeable that they could have, a claim for psychiatric injury could still 
succeed.36 To do this Lord Lloyd was required to rule that with regards to psychiatric injury 
cases the ‘eggshell skull’ principle should be applied to place defendants in a situation where 
they are required to take their victim as they find them. This has the effect of rendering the 
unforeseeable aspect of the psychiatric injury meaningless because the physical injury itself 
was reasonably foreseeable. This is strongly criticised by Mullany who argues that a defendant 
should only be liable for that which can be reasonably foreseen just before the accident.37 
 
From a legal standpoint Bailey and Nolan, argue that by allowing compensation for psychiatric 
injury to be permitted by foreseeability of physical injury this is a return to the objective ‘zone 
of danger’ approach which was favoured in the case of Dulieu v White but was departed from 
by the definition offered by Lord Oliver in Alcock.38 This is unfortunate owing to the fact the 
zone of danger approach was so heavily criticised for being unjust as it did not allow for 
claimants to claim for psychiatric injury where they could not have been physically hurt but 
                                                          
33 Mulheron, R., ‘The ‘Primary Victim’ in Psychiatric Illness Claims: Reworking the ‘Patchwork Quilt’ 
(2008) King’s Law Journal 19 at p.84. 
34 Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 (HL). 
35 More commonly referred to as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. 
36 Page, at p.187. 
37 Mullany, N., and Handford, P., Mullany and Handford's Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage, (2006) 
as cited in Bailey, S., and Nolan, D., ‘The Page v Smith Saga’. 
38 Alcock, at p.407. 
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suffered psychiatric injury all the same.39 From a medical standpoint, Ahuja on one hand 
praises Page v Smith as it allows ‘anyone at risk of any sort of physical injury in any type of 
situation [to] claim damages for psychiatric injury of any sort of severity’ which she believes is 
a ‘generous’ decision in favour of those suffering from pre-existing psychiatric harm.40 
However, Ahuja also criticises Page for its ‘naivety’ in believing that psychiatric injury is 
somehow more worthy of compensation when coupled with physical injury which is shown by 
the requirement that the claimant must be within ‘the range of foreseeable physical injury.’41 
Therefore, it appears Page has not only received criticism from the legal world but equally so 
from the medical one.  
 
The working definition of a primary victim was again considered by the House of Lords in 
White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire. Mulheron argues that this case does little more 
than ‘reiterate’ the decision in Page and as such she spares White from any further academic 
criticism opting instead to heavily critique the case of W v Essex CC42 which she describes as 
a ‘legal wrong turn’.43 The case concerned a family who decided to foster a child from the local 
authority. They asked for a child which did not have any history of being sexually abusive so 
as to protect their daughter. However, the local authority provided them with a child who did 
have a history of being sexually abusive and the child proceeded to abuse the daughter over 
a period of four weeks. After having discovered this, the parents suffered psychiatric injury for 
having subjected their daughter to this ordeal. Though this was a striking out application, and 
their Lordships made it very clear they were offering no opinion on the merits of the case, Lord 
Slynn opined, and all four Justices agreed, that the parents should be allowed to proceed as 
primary victims. This was because they had been made ‘unwilling participants’ of the ordeal 
and subsequently, in line with Alcock, entitled them to primary victim status. When explaining 
his reasoning Lord Slynn states that Alcock only provided examples of scenarios which may 
be indicative of a primary victim and that the issue of who is a primary victim remains open.44 
Arguably this decision did more damage to clarity in the imposition of liability for psychiatric 
harm than any other case as it essentially creates a fall-back position upon which claimants 
can again try to bring a claim. Therefore, as the law currently stands the primary victim test is: 
1 Was the claimant in the range of foreseeable physical injury? If not 
2 Was the claimant an unwilling participant in the event? 
                                                          
39 Bailey, S., and Nolan, D., ‘The Page v Smith Saga’ at pp.508-509. 
40 Ahuja, J., ‘Liability for Psychological and Psychiatric Harm: The Road to Recovery’ (2015) Medical 
Law Review 23 at p.41. 
41 Ibid at p.43. 
42W v Essex CC [2001] 2 AC 592. 
43 Mulheron, R., ‘The ‘Primary Victim’ in Psychiatric Illness Claims’ at p.88. 
44 Lord Slynn in W, at p.601. 
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If none of the above are met, then it would appear as if the claimant would not be able to be 
classed as a primary victim and as such would be refused compensation. 
 
3 Secondary Victims 
Arising out of the Hillsborough disaster Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire has been 
described by Lord Steyn as the ‘controlling decision’ on secondary victims.45 The case 
concerned 16 claims for psychiatric harm, these were test cases and in the court of first 
instance it was noted that these 16 claims were representative of approximately 150 other 
similar cases.46 However, when the case reached the House of Lords on appeal, for various 
reasons, only 10 claims remained.47 The House of Lords unanimously ruled that all 10 appeals 
should be dismissed reaching this opinion by applying what has become known as the Alcock 
criteria. These criteria provide that a claimant can bring a successful claim only when the 
following cumulative conditions are met:  
1 The claimant suffered a recognisable psychiatric condition induced by shock 
because of witnessing the event.48 
2 The claimant was proximate to the event in both time and space or was present at 
its immediate aftermath. 
3 The claimant had a close tie of love and affection with the imperilled victim. 
4 The claimant witnessed the event with their own unaided senses.49 
 
Alcock has received negative commentary from the judiciary50 and academics51 regarding the 
imposition of he above requirements which will be discussed further below. However, before 
doing so, to understand the criticism of Alcock it is first important to understand the judgement 
of McLoughlin v O’Brian which preceded it; the social context in which it was decided and the 
decisions of similar cases in other jurisdictions. The facts concerned a mother who was 
informed that members of her family had been involved in a car accident. She travelled to the 
hospital where they were being treated and she saw her husband and some of her children 
injured from the accident. she was then informed that her daughter had been killed. Mrs 
McLoughlin suffered psychiatric injury as a result and brought a claim for damages. Although 
their Lordships all sided with the claimant there are essentially two discernible rationes from 
the decision which, at the time, only served to further muddy the waters of an already disjointed 
area of law. Lord Bridge opined that once it had been proven that the claimant was suffering 
from a recognised psychiatric illness the only test which should be applied was whether the 
                                                          
45 Lord Steyn in White, at p.496. 
46 Hidden J in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1991] 1 All ER 353. 
47 Alcock, at p.388. 
48 Lord Ackner in Alcock, at p.399. 
49 Ibid., at p.402. 
50 Lord Hoffman in White, at p.511. 
51 Rajendran, R., ‘Told Nervous Shock: Has the Pendulum Swung in Favour of Recovery by 
Television Viewers?’ (2004) 9 Deakin Law Review 731 at p.734. 
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illness was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.52 He 
reached this conclusion on the belief that the law should not seek to draw arbitrary lines to 
limit liability. Rather every case must be decided on its own merits and he advocated a return 
to ‘the classic principles of negligence derived from Donoghue v Stevenson’.53 In doing so he 
relied heavily on the decision of Dillon v Legg,54 a case decided in the Supreme Court of 
California, where a simple test of factual reasonable foreseeability had also been adopted. 
Further, he stated that reasonable foreseeability should be assessed considering the relevant 
facts of each case such as: the claimant’s proximity to the accident; the claimant’s relationship 
to the victim and the way the claimant received the news.55 
 
Lord Wilberforce, opined that the claimant could bring a claim for damages only because Mrs 
McLoughlin met the criteria laid down in his judgement. The criteria he listed were essentially 
the guiding factors that Lord Bridge spoke of, but rather than remaining merely guiding factors 
as to the question of foreseeability, Lord Wilberforce saw fit to upgrade them to substantive 
rules of law.56 Further, Lord Wilberforce stated he was diametrically opposed to the notion that 
liability for psychiatric injury should be imposed based solely upon reasonable foreseeability. 
57 The disparate reasoning of the case was only worsened by the fact that the remaining Law 
Lords were also split. Lord Scarman sided with Lord Bridge, Lord Edmund-Davies with Lord 
Wilberforce and Lord Russell did neither and instead chose to ‘remain on the fence’58 
attempting to strike a balance between the two competing judgements. The confusion that this 
judgement caused is highlighted by Nolan59 in examples such as where two leading textbooks 
published after McLoughlin adopted completely opposite views as to the relevance of the case.  
 
The purpose of examining the decision of McLoughlin is because those academics who are 
critical of Alcock often build their criticism upon the notion that Alcock was a restrictive and 
conservative case.60 However, other academics, such as Teff, argue that Alcock, far from 
being restrictive, was merely an affirmation of precedent.61 Therefore, whatever view a person 
                                                          
52 McLoughlin, at p.443.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Dillon v Legg (1968) 441 P.2d 912. 
55 Lord Bridge in McLoughlin, at p.440. 
56 Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin, at p.420. 
57 Ibid pp.421-422. 
58 Nolan, D., in Mitchell, P. and Mitchell, C. Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort, (2010), at p.282 
59 Ibid at p.284. 
60 LITIGATION - A nervous breakdown – the House of Lords ruling in Page v Smith will be essential 
reading for personal injury lawyers p.1; Wheat, K., ‘Proximity and Nervous Shock’ (2003) 32 Common 
Law World Review 313. 
61 Teff, H., ‘Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Harm: Justifications and Boundaries’ (1998) 
The Cambridge Law Journal, 57 at p.93. 
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adopts towards Alcock, with regards to its contribution towards the patchwork quilt, in large 
part, will be dictated by whichever ratio that person feels carried the day in McLoughlin.  
 
Nolan has argued that the outcome in Alcock was potentially affected by the influx of manmade 
disasters before the House of Lords decision. In particular, he points to the Bradford Football 
stadium fire; the Marchioness pleasure boat disaster and the Herald of Free Enterprise 
disaster and provides a list in which a total of 979 people lost their lives by the time Alcock 
reached the House of Lords.62 Given the prevalence of the floodgates concern it is clear to 
see how these outside pressures could have caused concern to the House of Lords in Alcock. 
It is in this context that Davie states that the ratio decidendi was little more than a mask to hide 
their Lordships reliance on the ‘flood of claims concern’.63 Another notable change preceding 
the decision came about within the general tort of negligence itself. It is interesting to note that 
McLoughlin v O’Brian was decided at a time where a much wider duty of care was being 
considered by the courts as it was the Anns jurisprudence which was still being used. This 
may be why Lord Bridge and Lord Scarman advocated a simple test of reasonable 
foreseeability in McLoughlin as to do so was not too far a leap from the already established 
test. However, Alcock reached the House of Lords in 1992 when the general imposition of 
liability within the tort of negligence had contracted due to the new three-part test adopted in 
Caparo. It is in this context that Nolan argues that the decision of Alcock was almost 
inevitable.64  
 
Just as English jurisprudence shifted with regards to the imposition of liability within the 
general tort of negligence so too had jurisprudence for the imposition of liability for psychiatric 
harm in America. It has already been noted how Lord Bridge relied heavily upon Dillon v Legg65 
when deciding McLoughlin v O’Brian.66 Yet, by the time of Alcock the Californian Supreme 
Court, in Thing v La Chusa,67 had overruled Dillon v Legg instead opting for a more restrictive 
approach to imposing liability. Therefore, although not cited in the decision of Alcock, Nolan 
submits that the House of Lords would have been aware that the court upon which Lord Bridge 
had relied on in McLoughlin had now also departed from the simple test of reasonable 
foreseeability thereby suggesting a weakness of that position. 
 
                                                          
62 Nolan, D., in Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort, at p.291. 
63 Davie, M., ‘Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Illness: The Hillsborough Case in the House of Lords’, 
(1992) 43 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 237 atp.238. 
64 Nolan, D., Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort, at p.274. 
65 Dillon v Legg (1968) 441 P.2d 912. 
66 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 
67Thing v La Chusa 771 P 2d 814 (Cal 1989). 
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4 Problems with the Current Position 
Recognised Psychiatric Illness Caused by Shock 
Lord Ackner stated in Alcock that to bring a successful claim the claimant must be suffering 
from a recognised psychiatric injury.68 The immediate problem with this requirement is the 
differentiation between what is psychiatric injury and what is a psychological condition or mere 
emotional distress and why the first should be compensable but the other two not. This 
problem is relevant in the context of both secondary and primary victims as primary victims 
must satisfy this requirement as well. Some academics argue this requirement is too restrictive 
in nature69 Ahuja argues that the requirement for a recognised psychiatric injury can, in some 
cases, be too easily satisfied and that the courts sometimes reward the less deserving 
claimants in lieu of those who are not lucky enough to have their condition recognised by either 
DSM-V or ICD-10.70 Alternatively, she suggests that the test should be one of severity of 
distress caused rather than a recognised psychiatric illness using the example of grief.71 
According to Ahuja’s account there is little difference between the non-diagnosable grief and 
bereavement and the diagnosable, and therefore compensable, clinical depression. She 
contends that if the latter would receive compensation then so too should the former.72 Finally, 
she highlights the injustice in how grief, no matter how severe, is not compensable yet a 
recognised psychiatric injury, such as a specific phobia, which causes ‘milder or less pervasive 
distress’ is.73 
 
The recognised psychiatric injury must be caused by a sudden shock and does not include a 
gradual assault on the mind.74 Fordham criticises this requirement pointing to the case of Sion 
v Hampstead HA75 where a father watched his son slowly die over the course of 14 days yet 
his claim failed because the shock of death was not sudden.76 It is worth noting that Gibson 
LJ who presided over Sion appeared to also express a disagreement with the requirement 
stating that there is ‘no reason in logic why... an incident involving no violence or suddenness, 
such as where the wrong medicine is negligently given to a hospital patient, could not lead to 
                                                          
68 Alcock, at p.399. 
69 Mulheron, R., ‘Rewriting the Requirement for a ‘Recognized Psychiatric Injury’ in Negligence 
Claims’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 77 at p.81. 
70 Ahuja, ‘Liability for Psychological and Psychiatric Harm’ at p.36. 
71 Specific reference was made by Lord Griffiths in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire that 
grief is not compensable as it is ‘a common condition of mankind’. 
72 Ahuja, J., ‘Liability for Psychological and Psychiatric Harm’ at p.37. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Lord Ackner in Alcock, at p.401. 
75 Sion v Hampstead HA [1994] 5 Med. LR 17.0 
76 Fordham, M., ‘Psychiatric Injury, Secondary Victims and the ‘Sudden Shock’ Requirement’ (2014) 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies at p.47. 
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a claim for damages for nervous shock’.77 Given the criticism that this requirement has faced 
it is of little surprise that its abolition was advocated by the Law Commission’s report of 1998.78 
 
Proximity 
It has been argued that as the first major cases all concerned claimants who were near to the 
horrifying event this subliminally created the spatial proximity requirement. Wheat confirms 
this theory through conducting a close reading of Hambrook v Stokes concluding that the 
requirement of proximity essentially arose owing to the fact Lord Atkin implicitly implied it within 
the analogy he used where he cited that a duty was owed by drivers to those who use the 
highway.79 Wheat contends that it is in this way, due to the physical references of the analogy, 
that proximity was introduced into the test.80 Wheat has also stated that the immediate 
aftermath requirement is arbitrary and can create unjust results.81 It is submitted that this may 
be because of the way in which the courts have sought to curtail and modify the aftermath 
principle on what appears to be an almost irrational and ad hoc basis. A clear example of this 
can be found by contrasting the decisions of McLoughlin v O’Brian and Alcock v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire. 
 
In McLoughlin, their Lordships allowed the claim of a mother who visited the hospital after the 
accident which injured her family by opining that in doing so she had witnessed the immediate 
aftermath of the event and as such her claim should be allowed. But in Alcock the House of 
Lords dismissed the claims of those parents who visited the mortuary on the belief that 
because they had visited the mortuary with the purpose of identifying a deceased loved one 
their claims were materially different from that of the defendants in McLoughlin because they 
visited with the intention to provide comfort. Nolan critiques this decision by saying that it is 
unclear why the purpose of the claimant in visiting the aftermath of the scene should play any 
part in whether compensation is awarded.82 Although there are numerous examples of the 
difficulty in applying this principle one of the most striking appears to be the notion that Mrs 
McLoughlin could only succeed in her case because her family members were still muddied 
from their accident. In the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce uses the oil and dirt in which the 
claimant’s family members were so begrimed to circumvent the fact that Mrs McLoughlin did 
not arrive at the actual immediate aftermath of the incident at the roadside where it happened. 
                                                          
77 Sion, at p.176. 
78 Law Commission, Liability for Psychiatric Illness Report, (1998, Law Commission No.249) at 
para.5.33. 
79 Hambrook, at p.164. 
80 Wheat, K., ‘Proximity and Nervous Shock’ (2003) 32 Common Law World Review 313 at p.319. 
81 Ibid at p.314. 
82 Nolan, D., Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort, at p.280. 
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He opines that it makes no difference whether she comes upon her family on the roadside or, 
as in this case, in the hospital when they are in the same condition as they were at the 
roadside.83 It therefore follows that if the claimant’s family members had not been in the 
condition which they were there would have been no other factor upon which Lord Wilberforce 
could warrant an extension of the aftermath principle.  
 
With One’s Own Unaided Senses 
Those viewing the Hillsborough disaster as it played out live were unable to bring a claim as 
they had not witnessed the event with their own unaided senses but rather through the medium 
of TV. Perhaps the most perturbing example of the arbitrary nature of this requirement comes 
from Alcock itself and the circumstances of Mr and Mrs Copoc. Both claimants suffered 
psychiatric harm yet their claims failed. Lord Keith opined that the mere knowledge that their 
son was at the stadium did not create the sufficient proximity and that as it was broadcast, at 
best, it could give rise to anxiety as opposed to the required psychiatric injury.84 This is 
surprising considering that psychological studies have long reported that those relatives who 
chose to view their loved one's bodies after death were glad they did because the reality is 
often better than what they had imagined.85 Based on this evidence it is hard not to agree with 
Mullany when she calls the refusal to compensate Mr and Mrs Copoc a low point in English 
tort law.86 Also, in large part, the refusal to compensate those who viewed the event via live 
TV rested heavily upon the Broadcasting Code of Ethics which prevented the broadcast of 
distressing images and the fact that this was known to the defendant.87 This decision has been 
described as ‘absurd’ and ‘dangerous’ as at any time the Broadcasting authority could amend 
the Code of Ethics or a conscientious broadcaster could, inadvertently, broadcast a distressing 
image.88 Finally, with the rise in technology and access to online communication videos of 
distressing news appears to be more frequently recorded and broadcast by private individuals 
who are not subject to the Broadcasting Code of Ethics.89 One example is the video which 
                                                          
83 McLoughlin at p.419. 
84 Lord Keith in Alcock, at p.398. 
85 Chapple, A., and Ziebland, S., ‘Viewing the body after bereavement due to a traumatic death: 
qualitative study in the UK’ British Medical Journal (2010). 
 http://www.bmj.com/content/340/bmj.c2032  accessed 13 April 2017. 
86 Mullany, N., ‘Personal perception of trauma and sudden shock: South Africa simplifies matters.’ 
(2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review at p.31. 
87 Alcock, at p.398. 
88 Rajendran, ‘Told Nervous Shock’ at p.745. 
89 It is unclear why reference to the Broadcasting Code of Ethics was included in this judgement at all. 
Even if the broadcasting company did inadvertently broadcast distressing images and constituted a 
novus actus interveniens, the claimant would still not have been present at the scene of the event so 
their claim should fail. Perhaps this is yet another indication that because this case concerned the police 
force special exemptions had to be made. This poses the question of what the outcome would have 
been if the negligent act at Hillsborough was committed by a private individual. 
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emerged online of a passenger who was visibly injured and distressed whilst being dragged 
off of the United Airlines flight.90 That video was not broadcast by any news agency but could 
still have to potential, if viewed by his wife or children, to cause psychiatric injury as such, at 
present the Alcock requirements are unable to accommodate one of the fastest growing 
broadcasters of distressing images in today’s society.  
 
Ties of Love and Affection 
To bring a claim, the claimant must prove that there is a close tie of love and affection between 
them and the victim. Teff argues that this requirement is ‘a stipulation which represents an 
embarrassment to the legal process as well as to the substantive law’91. Yet, despite the 
apparent lack of humanity within this requirement commentators, in large part, believe it should 
remain provided it can be updated to include all other familial relationships as it is an effective 
way of preventing a flood of claims. It has even been suggested that this expansion should 
include everything from fiancées to co-workers.92 The Law Commission has argued for a via 
media of a fixed list of relationships, wider than that which currently exists, where close ties of 
love and affection are presumed but claimants who are not on the list have the opportunity to 
provide evidence of a close tie of love and affection in order to bring a claim.93 This appears 
to be the most logical approach as it would create some certainty with regards to the class of 
people who could claim, prevent the embarrassing spectacle of trying to prove brotherly love 
in court, but at the same time would retain flexibility as those outside the list would still have 
the ability to bring a claim. In addition, this would appear to address the concerns of Stocker 
LJ in Alcock where he observes that relatives and friends might feel the same towards a 
primary victim as a spouse or parent would.94 
 
5 The Road to Reform 
The Universal Criterion 
It was highlighted above how in some cases the current requirement that primary and 
secondary victims must suffer from a recognised psychiatric injury can lead to situations of 
injustice. This occurs because those who suffer a psychological disorder are not entitled to 
bring a claim as they fall short of the recognised psychiatric illness requirement. This was 
highlighted as being illogical especially in circumstances as shown by Ahuja, where those 
                                                          
90 United Airlines: Passenger forcibly removed from flight, BBC News, 10 April 2017 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39554421.  
91 Teff, ‘Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Harm’ at p.93. 
92 The Negligence and Damages Bill 2017 – a private members Bill currently being proposed by Andy 
McDonald MP. 
93 Law Commission, Liability for Psychiatric Illness Report, at para 6.28. 
94 Stocker LJ in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1991] 3 All ER 88 at p.20 of the Official 
Transcript. 
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suffering from specific phobias can bring a claim yet those suffering from highly debilitating 
grief cannot. It is submitted that to remedy this situation a requirement that the claimant suffers 
from a mental disorder, caused by the defendant, as opposed to a recognised psychiatric 
illness, should be adopted. This would have the benefit of keeping in place some form of 
control mechanism, thereby holding back a flood of claims, yet it would also allow claims by 
those claimants who currently, although deserving, are not afforded any redress. Finally, it is 
worth noting that this adaptation would also be in line with the reform suggested by the Scottish 
Law Commission who favour the same approach.95 
 
Eggshell Skulls, Reasonable Foreseeability and Primary Victims 
The accuracy of Lord Goff cannot be doubted when in White v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire he described Page v Smith as ‘a remarkable departure from generally accepted 
principles [of the tort of negligence]’.96 The most troubling aspect of Page is Lord Lloyd’s 
finding that owing to the eggshell skull principle Mr Page need not have actually suffered a 
physical injury in order to bring a claim for psychiatric injury provided that it was proven 
reasonably foreseeable that Mr Page could have suffered a physical injury. There are two 
scenarios in which the egg shell skull rule can apply. First, where the claimant suffers an actual 
physical injury which is particularly worsened by a pre-existing physical condition, for example 
where a claimant suffers a fractured skull owing only to the fact they have a particularly thin 
skull.97 Second, as Bailey and Nolan point out, where a claimant undergoes a physical injury 
and immediately thereafter suffers psychiatric harm owing to some pre-existing psychological 
disposition.98 It can only apply in these two scenarios because in the absence of these two 
scenarios there is simply no actual injury to which the thin skull doctrine can attach.  
In trying to understand why the eggshell rule was applied in this way it is useful to examine 
the analogy used by Lord Lloyd in Page v Smith. Lord Lloyd stated that if Mr Page had been 
travelling in the car with his wife, who suffered from a pre-existing depressive condition and, 
as a result of the accident, she suffered a cracked rib which was quickly followed by the onset 
of a psychiatric illness, she would clearly be able to claim damages for the psychiatric injury 
owing to the eggshell skull rule. He then reasoned that if Mrs Page would receive 
compensation, it would be unjust to deny Mr Page compensation for the psychiatric injury he 
sustained purely because he did not suffer an accompanying foreseeable physical injury.99 
However, that is arguably the exact reason why Mr Page’s claim should have been denied. In 
                                                          
95 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury, (2004, Scottish Law 
Commission No 196) at para 3.10. 
96 White, at p.473. 
97 Owens v Liverpool Corporation [1939] 1 KB 394 at p.401. 
98 Bailey, S., and Nolan, D., ‘The Page v Smith Saga’ at p.509. 
99 Lord Lloyd in Page, at p.187. 
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a vehicular collision, it would seem logical that a defendant should only be liable for that which 
is reasonably foreseeable to occur. Broken bones and fractured skulls can be foreseen by 
every reasonable driver. This is not the case for standalone pathological depression, myalgic 
encephalomyelitis or any other psychiatric illness. This interpretation of the eggshell skull rule 
appears to leave defendants with what seems to be an unfair burden of having to provide 
compensation for unforeseeable injuries as well as foreseeable ones. As such, it appears that 
the circumstances of Page v Smith are exactly those instances which Mulheron warns against 
where she states that ‘all too frequently the courts have chosen to sacrifice doctrinal clarity to 
help unfortunate claimants’.100 For these reasons, it is submitted that at least in the context of 
reasonable foreseeability Page should be overturned. Doing so would allow the courts to 
return to a method of imposing liability where a defendant is only liable for the damage which 
was reasonably foreseeable just before the event in question. Such a view finds favour with 
Bailey and Nolan101 and would also be in line with the method adopted by the Australian 
judiciary.102 To overrule Page v Smith would allow the law relating to primary victims to return 
to a logical method of imposing liability for psychiatric harm. It would also show that the law 
treats psychiatric injury with the same regard as physical injury and finally give meaning to the 
words of Lord Lloyd in Page where he advises that the law should not be seen to limp too far 
behind medical advances.103 
 
Gradually Caused Psychiatric Harm 
The requirement that the recognised psychiatric illness must be caused by a sudden shock 
has clearly given rise to arbitrary applications of the law. Through case law examples 
highlighted above it has been shown to be a vehicle for dismissing otherwise deserving claims 
despite the fact that the origin of this requirement is unclear. In Alcock, the first case where 
the requirement was expressly confirmed, Lord Oliver opined that it was a common feature of 
all cases of psychiatric injury that the injury for which damages were being claimed must be 
shock induced.104 If this is true then it would appear reasonable to suggest that the requirement 
may be an anachronism from the now embarrassing days of when liability was imposed via 
the much-criticised impact rule which, by its very nature, must be sudden. It could therefore 
follow that although the impact rule fell out of favour with the courts the requirement that the 
harm be caused in similarly quick manner remained. In any event, the mere fact it has always 
been present does not mean that it must always be present. If the sudden shock requirement 
                                                          
100 Mulheron, ‘The ‘Primary Victim’ in Psychiatric Illness Claims’ at p.82. 
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were disposed of then this would allow the rules pertaining to secondary victims to become 
less arbitrary in their application. Also, with its removal the unpalatable distinctions which have 
characterised this area of law would cease to exist such as the reasoning behind why the 
‘horrifying’ descent of a runaway lorry is compensable but the slow backing of a taxi is not.105 
 
Lord Bridge or Lord Wilberforce? 
In 1983, the law pertaining to secondary victims was arguably on the cusp of fairness and 
logic owing to McLoughlin v O’Brian. Yet unfortunately, the House of Lords cut short that 
prospect when the ratio of Lord Wilberforce was subsequently affirmed in Alcock which led to 
the adoption of the heavily criticised control mechanisms used throughout this area of law. It 
is submitted that the implementation of each one of Lord Wilberforce’s proposed control 
mechanisms has created unreasonable and unjustifiable distinctions and that the way forward 
suggested by Lord Bridge would have been the more suitable path to follow. That is, a system 
whereby a defendant is liable only for those injuries which they can reasonably foresee and 
where the current control mechanisms are used as guiding factors in determining reasonable 
foreseeability. It is noted, that in order to progress down this path that the three-part test from 
Caparo v Dickman Industries Plc106 will have to be overturned. However, doing so might 
address the various criticisms which have been raised above and, as argued below, could 
give rise to a more reasoned and logical method of imposing liability. 
 
The Question of Proximity 
It is clear that in order to strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the defendant 
and the claimant the law of psychiatric injury must have some way of curtailing otherwise 
frivolous claims. However, imposing strict requirements of physical proximity to the horrifying 
event is perhaps not the most effective vehicle through which to do it. To contrast the case of 
Taylorson v Shieldness Produce Ltd107 with Galli Atkinson v Seghal108 serves as a useful 
illustration of why previous applications of such a strict proximity requirement have given rise 
to so much criticism. In Taylorson the parents of a child were informed of an accident in which 
their son was involved. They arrived at the hospital where they were told their son was being 
transferred to another hospital. They followed the ambulance and once inside the mother saw 
her son’s bruised face whilst the father saw his son’s hand limply hanging off of the trolley. 
                                                          
105 The distinction drawn by Lord Denning in King v Phillips [1953] 1 QB 429 (CA) at p.535. 
 where distinguished the case from that of Hambrook v Stokes [1925] 1 KB 141 and in doing so refused 
the claim by a suffering mother because, in his mind, only a runaway lorry was capable of causing 
psychiatric harm but the slow reverse of a taxicab was not.  
106 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman and Others [1990] 1 All ER 568. 
107 Taylorson v Shieldness Produce Ltd [1994] PIQR P329. 
108 Galli Atkinson v Seghal [2003] EWCA Civ 697. 
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After 8 hours, they saw their son with his face badly injured and with medical apparatus 
protruding from his skull, two days later they switched off their son’s life support machine.109 
The Court of Appeal held they arrived at the hospital too late. Their claim failed.  
 
Yet the rather similar facts of Galli Atkinson were interpreted very differently. In Galli Atkinson, 
a child was killed by a car mounting the pavement and died at 7:40 pm. The mother arrived at 
the police cordon at around 8:40 pm and although she saw nothing of the actual accident she 
was told her daughter was dead. She subsequently visited the mortuary at around 9:15 pm to 
identify her child which, in total, was 2 hours and 10 minutes after the fatal accident. The Court 
of Appeal found her to have arrived in time. Her claim succeeded.  
Distinctions of this sort could be avoided if the idea of proximity were interpreted only in the 
sense in which it was interpreted in Boardman v Sanderson110 where the court held that as 
the claimant was nearby, and that as the defendant knew he was, it was more reasonably 
foreseeable that the claimant would suffer from psychiatric injury.111 
 
From Cain and Abel to David and Jonathan112 
The views of several academics were referenced, all of whom agree that the requirement of a 
close tie of love and affection between the claimant and the immediate victim is unfair. In light 
of this revelation, this requirement can be categorised as perhaps the most unedifying of the 
requirements that currently exist. As such, if the simple reasonably foreseeable model is to be 
adopted then it is doubtful whether this requirement, even as a guiding principle, should have 
any part to play. However, the need to impose some form of a further restrictive factor upon 
the claims which can be brought cannot be ignored else the imposition of liability as a whole 
may spiral out of control if, for example, bystanders could bring successful claims. Therefore, 
it would appear logical to utilise some form of relational reference in establishing reasonable 
foreseeability because as Lord Wilberforce observed without any reference to relational 
factors, defendants may be required to compensate the world at large.113 In this vein, the Law 
Commission’s fixed list recommendation, as highlighted above, would appear suitable.114 The 
sensitivity of the issues often encapsulated within claims for psychiatric injury suggest that if 
the relationship which forms the subject of the litigation should appear on this list then the 
court should consider that the harm caused was prima facie reasonably foreseeable, unless 
                                                          
109 Notably, it was witnessing their son alive but in such a severe state in the hospital which caused 
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there is an extremely compelling reason raised by the defendant as to why it should not be. It 
follows that those outside the list should not be able to bring a successful claim unless there 
is some incontrovertible evidence to suggest that there was a close tie of love and affection. 
Such an approach would create a true via media between affording protection to claimants 
and not allowing liability to spiral out of control.  
 
Conclusion 
In Alcock the claims by those relatives who witnessed the horrifying events unfold on live 
simultaneous TV were denied as they had not witnessed the event with their own unaided 
senses. The experiences of Mr and Mrs Copoc who watched the Hillsborough disaster unfold 
whilst worrying for their son’s life have already been explicitly mentioned. Their claim was 
denied due to the belief that the worry which they must have been experiencing was only 
capable of giving rise to mere anxiety and not the required recognised psychiatric illness. It 
has already been shown that one of the potential problems with this distinction is that those 
who know their loved ones are in danger but are not near to them may in fact suffer more 
harm than those who are near to their endangered loved ones. If this is true, does it not follow 
that the experiences of claimants such as Mr and Mrs Copoc, should be compensable? With 
the advance of technology, the law must be able to adapt to the changing world. The plight of 
the passenger who was dragged off of a United Airlines flight has already been mentioned. 
There have also been instances of criminals using the ‘live stream’ feature on the popular 
social media site Facebook to instantaneously broadcast murders of innocent people115 and a 
case where a mother saw her 11-month-old daughter being hanged by the father via the 
Facebook live feature.116 It is submitted that the law should have in mind situations such as 
these as it is not inconceivable that such scenarios could occur in the UK. If a situation such 
as this did take place in the UK, it may be seen as unjust if the claimants in such cases were 
denied compensation owing purely to the fact they watched the murder take place via a phone 
or computer rather than in real life. This would unfortunately be the case and it is a position 
which has been criticised by both Butler117 and Rajendran118 who have highlighted the 
illogicality of curtailing claims based on whether or not they were viewed through some form 
of medium. 
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Given the above recommended move towards imposing liability through the application of the 
simple reasonably foreseeable test this requirement should have no part to play in the 
determination of liability for psychiatric injury. It should be neither a determinative requirement 
nor a guiding factor towards establishing reasonable foreseeability. As reasonable 
foreseeability will already be aided by factors such as nearness to the event which imperilled 
the immediate victim and relational ties between the claimant and the victim there is little else 
that the claimant witnessing the event with their own unaided senses could contribute. 
 
 
